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Abstract  
This article develops a notion of time-specificity of performance. It begins by taking a 
temporal approach to performance through the philosophy of Henri Bergson. It looks 
at three artists/collectives, Tehching Hsieh, Every house Has a Door, Janez Janša, 
Janez Janša and Janez Janša. Their practices play with notions of the present, past 
and future, and by doing so set new terms for a temporal aesthetics of experience. 
Time-specificity opens up reconsiderations of pivotal notions within performance such 
as repetition, documentation and freedom. 
 
Temporality and Choreographic Practices  
  What is at stake in considerations of performance and temporality is a 
placement of value on performance through its relationship to time. The events made 
possible by choreographic practices are not utopias, not perfect, but are sites 
inseparable from the radical difference and immanence inherent to lived time. In a 
historical moment when programmatic structures built on an algorithmic apparatus 
more or less visibly determine our social interactions, choreographic practices become 
crucial because they expose themselves. In time-specificity the performance invites 
its attendants to hack its structures in order to make the performance mean and do 
something. That something might be the activities involved in sharing duration, which 
collectivize groups around creative ideologies. Therefore I will argue that there is a link 
between performance duration and creativity that leads to an awareness of freedom.  
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 The notion of choreographic practices, defined here as principled forms for 
structuring aesthetic experience, opens a space for a consideration of the essential 
acts of endurance that attendance at such events requires. Time is shared as it 
passes. As the performance becomes, as the choreography is attended, it changes 
through itself and in response to its conditions. It becomes necessary to elaborate 
what exactly is the nature of this endurance at the heart of attending, attending being 
the work that all involved in the performance are capable of, artist and audience alike. 
The temporality of performance implied through the notion of choreographic practices, 
a processual heterogeneity of activities, is crucial to the understanding what is at stake 
in contemporary performance in regard to aesthetic and social concerns.  
 The following discussion argues that choreographic practices are in themselves 
affirmative gestures of temporal activity, or strategies that reveal and revel in the 
importance of sharing time. Temporality returns to performance a conception of its 
politics as choreographic. In order to explain how this occurs, I will consider three 
performances in which a nature of time, present, past and future, is itself explored. 
How these works transform the passage of time will be framed through a discussion 
of the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson’s relevance is his focus on the 
experiential nature of temporality, mirrored by time-specificity’s focus on the 
experience of performance. In order to vitalize the politics of choreographic practices 
this discussion aims to offer a reconsideration of both temporality and performance 
through their relation. 
 To consider the relationship between performance and temporality requires a 
careful use of terms. The difference between the word ‘in’ and the word ‘of’ 
distinguishes between the dominant chronological mode of temporality and the 
experience-based theory of duration found in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. The 
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difference consists of abstracted versus lived time. In more simple words, when 
something is in time, time is a dimension. When something is of time, time is a force 
of creativity. Clock time has achieved a ubiquity in culture to the point that time itself 
is rarely defined in any other way than with clocks. However, time-specificity conceives 
of duration as the core of temporality and considers clock time to as a system used to 
measure that force. Time and duration are related to speed, movement, distance, 
seasons, weather, reproduction, death and life, but these are factors of temporality 
rather than it itself. When temporality might have more than one definition, it becomes 
to important to be clear on what exactly it might be in relation to performance and 
choreographic practices.  
 That is why time-specificity becomes a useful term. Time-specificity is a mode 
of thinking performance from a practical standpoint in which the attention is toward 
temporality, as a complement to spatial forms of analysis. I will not claim therefore that 
all theatre or even some theatre is time-specific. Taxonomic gestures risk reducing the 
complexity of how choreographic practices alter and are altered by temporality. In a 
completely different vein then, time-specificity is a mode that attends to emergences 
in performance. It is performance in purely lived temporal terms. Time-specificity 
uncovers the vital forces of performance that continually change, endure through 
transformation and memory, and are constantly becoming different through creation. 
 To consider the issues of present, past and future time-specificity this article 
will attend to the work of one solo artist and two collectives. To explore the relation 
between performance and duration I will discuss the work of Taiwanese-American 
artist Tehching Hsieh. His One Year Performances reveal the need for a temporal 
approach to performance historiography that thinks documentation as memory. That 
gives way to a consideration of the Chicago-based collective Every House Has a 
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Door’s performance Nine Beginnings, which questioned the virtuality of the archive. 
With the present of performance as duration and documentation as memory 
considered through the lens of time-specificity, I turn toward the future in order to 
consider the open-ended social possibilities of performance through the name change 
project of three Slovenian artists Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša.  
Time-specificity of the present as duration in Tehching Hsieh 
 In the performance art works of Tehching Hsieh there is a conscious 
experimentation with the passage of time. Potentially his work amounts to the creation 
of alternative clocks, if a clock might be defined as an arbitrary system of proof or 
measure for the reality of endurance as change. Consider Hsieh’s framing technique 
of beginning each yearlong performance with his head shaved, in order to allow it to 
grow uncut for the year. Duration is multiple; it includes a mass of changes at variable 
levels of perceptibility. The growth of Hsieh’s hair is but one mark among many that 
mark passages of time that sit outside typical frames of perception, in which time is 
capitalized. For Hsieh time is not money, time is passing, it is duration. It is the basis 
of being alive and the basis of art. 
 In ‘Time-clock Piece’, Hsieh’s performance from 1980-1981, Hsieh entered his 
studio every hour on the hour, inserted a time card into an industrial time clock, which 
punched the time of day onto the card. Hsieh then turned around, took a photo of 
himself with a specially modified 16mm camera set up to expose a single frame at a 
time, then exited the studio. This amounted to eight thousand seven hundred sixty 
punches of which Hsieh missed a mere one hundred thirty-three. Hsieh’s performance 
and documentation reveal a useful comparison that illuminates Henri Bergson’s 
conception of the difference in kind between clock time and duration or lived time, 
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leading to new definitions of concepts of performance aesthetics such as repetition, of 
which I will now discuss. 
 Each time card is a small yellow piece of paper that when completed shows a 
series of times, a matrix of numbers. They are countable. These times of the clock are 
instants, the flash in which Hsieh was ready at the clock with the card. It is clock time 
in its most material and immobile form. The time on the time card is not time itself, but 
is a mark attributable to a certain moment, given meaning as passage when in relation 
to the following and previous instants. For social life to function, moments are attached 
to certain numbers, markers that give order. This is what Bergson calls scientific or 
clock time. It is made up of number, a measurement, it is a quantitative multiplicity. It 
can be divided into parts without changing their nature, as with the conception of space 
that Zeno elaborates in the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Through this sub-
divisibility, number is paradoxically both multiple and singular. The time on the card is 
one moment and yet is made up of a multiplicity, for example ten hours, a 
measurement of the interval between midnight and ten in the morning. Ten is a single 
number and the accumulation of the numbers between zero and itself. Each time on 
the time card, and each time card, has a regularity that is both many and one. 
 This regularity is the homogeneity of clock time. Each time card must be the 
same structure as the others, as each minute must be made of sixty seconds. For 
order the system’s elements remove the variability of speed of experience. Each time 
card is one day. Put together, they make up another whole which is another number 
and yet many numbers, which are homogeneous and at the same time distinguishable. 
Each must have some difference that allows them to be counted together while 
maintaining enough similarity to be contained in a group. The homogeneity of clock 
time is the medium in which number clarifies moments of experience.  
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Clock time admits of the difference of kind of each minute of experience while 
requiring a quantitative difference between each of its composite elements. The time 
cards show how life continues differentiating even as clock time repeats its closed 
system indefinitely. Clock time requires duration but duration does not require clock 
time. It is a mistake to assume, as Zeno and some sciences do, that experience is 
dependent on measure. Bergson responds to Zeno’s paradox by differentiating 
between the measure of travel and the act of moving itself (Bergson 2001 pgs. 113-
115). Time-specificity privileges the act of moving. Hsieh’s performance does not 
require documentation, rather the performance produces documents. Endurance as 
change makes measurement and abstract dimensions possible. Thus clock time for 
Bergson is number, a quantitative multiplicity, homogeneity and an abstraction of 
space that is a product of duration (Bergson 2001 pgs. 75-104).  
For Hsieh’s Time-clock piece, clock time and measurement are found in not 
only the time cards but also the resulting film made up of the series of photographs 
taken throughout the year. The frames run in order and collapse the year into a video 
shorter than seven minutes. At least three measures of time can be found in the video. 
The hour hand of the clock can be seen rotating quickly through each hour of the year. 
The time cards themselves show the accumulation of durations. The inked-in punches 
rise up the time card and disappear, making way for another day and another fresh 
card to fill with another column of hourly punches. Each time punched on the card sits 
together, as if these successive moments were simultaneous.  
 These technicalities are the least striking elements of the video. What stands 
out is the face of the man. Hsieh’s simple focus remains throughout. The minor 
differences of position for each photograph amount to a moving body but that 
movement is caused by the succession of stills. The film and its measures of clock 
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time are meaningful because they are attached to the experience of Hsieh. The viewer 
recognizes the extremity of the performance. It takes virtuosity, but not of technique. 
Hsieh’s is a virtuosity of commitment, concept and dedication, a feat of discipline and 
devotion. The video proves that the act was done. The video and the documents the 
act produced are purposefully indexical to the actual experience of the performance. 
That Hsieh’s face continues to appear while his hair grows, the clock winds and the 
time cards fill up, displays the inability of the document to itself account fully for that 
which is lived, which is the experience of endurance.  
 Bergson calls this experience of passing time duration. Lived time is the activity, 
or the implement of choreographic practice that makes the film and punch cards 
possible. Duration is, for Bergson, nothing like number. It is pure continuity instead of 
juxtaposition. It is a heterogeneity of qualities. Thus duration and the performance are 
qualitative multiplicities. Still multiple, each part is a quality as opposed to a 
measurement. For One Year Performance, the lived durations are the crux of the 
artwork. The documents allow others to imagine that primary aspect of Hsieh’s 
practice. Some qualities of the performance are the patience, the lack of sleep, his 
resolve to continue. These qualities or aspects of the performance are a pure 
heterogeneity that interpenetrate through their continuity with each other. They differ 
as they repeat and they are immeasurable. The performance itself is a lived action. It 
is an actuality while the documentation materializes the virtual. Duration and the 
performance are mobilities, the constant becoming of change that is always 
manifesting difference. Duration is related to but nothing like abstract geometrical 
space, a dimension made up of quantitative multiplicities. Duration is pure qualitative 
multiplicity (Bergson 2001 pgs. 105-139 and 226).  
Temporal repetition through Hsieh 
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 One might argue that Hsieh is doing the same thing over and over again. He is 
repeating the action of going to the time clock, punching a card and taking a photo of 
himself. It is an act of extended repetition. Perhaps each punch of the clock and each 
photo in this understanding have only a difference of degree between each iteration 
of the entire group. Repetition then would be a process of homogeneous constructions 
of the same. It is nothing other than multiple copies of objects in space co-existing 
simultaneously. This is repetition ‘in’ time. But this is of course a process that requires 
a dimension, whereas because duration is a force it itself has no dimension. Repetition 
through process and change must be different in kind from repetition of objects in 
space. How then can repetition be conceived through time-specificity when we 
substitute of for in, or repetition of time? If in duration the past interpenetrates with the 
present through memory, there must be a difference in kind between an action of the 
present and a similar one of the past.  
In Hsieh’s performance the difference in kind between the past and present 
action is secured by the memory of the past photo and card punch interpenetrating 
with the current actuality. Repetition cannot be considered as an operation of 
sameness. Duration operates through the becoming of difference. Temporal repetition 
is ontogenetic difference in kind, with an appearance of difference of degree attributed 
through the mind remembering the past.  
In time-specificity repetition is a tensioning of the force of duration. It may 
increase or decrease tension, but it is only symbolically like the repetition that consists 
of two or more objects sitting side by side simultaneously. The tension that arises 
through repetition of and in performance reveals the difference that is inherent to 
duration. Repetition adjusts the pressure of performance when temporality is a force. 
Moments are unrepeatable because the past persists, which requires repetition to alter 
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momentum. This reveals the depth of Hsieh’s extended durations, which manifest 
through tensioning lived experience.  
Time-specificity of performance past  
 If temporal repetition within a performance is a process of tensioning, might 
repetition of a given performance work in a similar way when viewed through the lens 
of time-specificity? In concrete terms, what exactly about a performance from the past 
can be repeated again in the present and how does this occur? Documents extend 
the reach of experiential arts, and thinking documentation temporally prompts 
reconsiderations of art historiography. The chosen document for drama is the script. 
It is used as the base to create the performance and usually records a specific iteration 
of the play. However choreographic practices that are not reliant on text alone require 
alternative modes of documentation in order to make the past accessible in the 
present. From the 1970’s onward it would appear that photography and video are the 
dominant forms of documentation for less literary forms of performance. In comparison 
to dramatic scripts, photographic documents perform different functions and they 
affect the way history is made and accessed. 
 For art that is less text-based than drama, the terms score and record are useful 
alternatives to script. Many forms of contemporary choreographic practices, such as 
the work of Jonathan Burrows and Matteo Fargion, employ the word score to 
processes that take both composed indeterminacy and the idea of writing as a practice 
to be important methodology. A score awaits manifestation. It does not claim to 
encapsulate the experience of the. It is instead a guide to the work of art, serving a 
diagrammatic function. The score gives to the artist in the studio a set of precepts and 
principles from which to work. The score is defined by its choreographic futurity.  
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As the score looks forward into the future, on the other hand, the record looks 
back. Records cast their viewers into the role of audience distanced from the 
performance, while the viewer of the score is an artist, an interpreter. Distinguishing 
between these two kinds of documents is important because it shows what they are 
made to do. However the mode of access by the present of the past also can alter the 
status of the relationship to history. It is similar to the way recollection can alter 
memory from the present, causing the appearance of the past to be different. This is 
in fact a repurposing of the past of the present. Time-specificity takes account of not 
only how documents are produced but also approaches to accessing them. Virtuality, 
as the non-actual field of memory and performance documents, offers insight into the 
potentials of documents to be transformed through modes of access. The differences 
between documents depends on use as much as it depends on how it was produced. 
Records might end up as scores. 
 A concrete example of the transferability of scores and records is evident in the 
recent Every House Has a Door production 9 Beginnings. The Chicago based 
company was commissioned to make a performance that responds to other artists’ 
archives in Bristol at Arnolfini. The company decided to re-perform the beginnings of 
nine different performances archived on video. Videos in the framework of time-
specificity are records, but for 9 Beginnings they would be functioning as scores. That 
Every House Has a Door did not attempt to restage each work faithfully reinforces the 
argument that these records were used as scores, as the score is a document open 
to interpretation and manifestation. However there is an earlier score that begun to 
operate before the videos were selected. This is first the score of the commission, to 
respond to other artists’ archives. Later there is another score, to choose and restage 
the first three or so minutes of nine video documents of performances. What this 
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example shows is the immanent mixture of scores and records that operate in concrete 
examples. There are always complex mixtures of the actual and the virtual 
interpenetrating in the creation of performance. Different scales of perception will 
indicate different scores. Time-specificity takes account of the complexity of multiple 
tendencies that operate in performance processes. Any given lived art will have a 
specific configuration of documentation relation. Looking at a single work at various 
levels of magnitude will necessitate different versions of documents for the same 
piece, which can indicate historical reformulations of the score/performance/record 
relation. 
Documentation as memory 
 9 Beginnings proves a useful case study in understanding how memory reveals 
operations within the relationship between performance and documentation.   The 
performance is considered to be authored by Every House Has a Door, and yet the 
audience is given a program that details where each beginning comes from. Each of 
these beginnings required a different form of reenactment. 9 Beginnings only had two 
performers for a piece that consisted previously of three dancers. Every House Has a 
Door choose to divide the dance into parts and loop it several times, in order to form 
a composite performance in which every relation of two dancers within the initial three 
were performed. In a way, the entirety of the choreography was danced, but only if 
synthesized simultaneously through memory. But as was shown earlier, experienced 
time is not a dimension that can be subdivided and reorganized. Memory is what 
allows virtuality to create the continuities necessary between these different 
performances. The version for 9 Beginnings was related to but different in kind from 
the dance on video. 
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 If memory is the way the present accesses the past, then performance 
documents, such as the video of the three dancers, can be considered memories. 
Thinking performance through this temporal relation offers a model in which a given 
work of art becomes in constantly changing forms of manifestation. These forms, like 
momentary rememberings, are a single iteration of a heterogeneous piece of art, 
which contains various performances, scores and records. Each becoming, each 
creation, is an act of accessing other temporalities, because while each iteration is 
different, it will also be continuous with the others, be they simultaneous, past or future. 
Diagrams of Time-specificity: mapping the relationship between performance, 
memory and documentation 
Diagramming may facilitate understanding the complex multiple tendencies that 
operate within the creation of a performance. Taking a genealogical approach to the 
development of creating a work of live art, scores beget performances which beget 
records. The table [Figure 1] accounts for this general concept and defines each 
category. However it represents a linear and divided process, which is in practice more 
continuous and interpenetrative. So the second diagram [Figure 2] groups scores and 
records into one broader category as documents and shows how memory is what 
connects these materials to the experience of performance.  
Memory flows between performance and documentation, continuously, 
creating becomings of form that manifest as variable mixtures of scores, performances 
and records. This conclusion leads to [Figure 3] the performance memory 
documentation cone, inspired by Henri Bergson’s memory cone from Matter and 
Memory (Bergson 2004 pg. 197). The documentation cone shows a particular 
configuration of a mixture, in which performance, in the realm of the real and actual, 
pierces the lower left sphere at the level of perception. The surface of the sphere is 
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clock time, while its movement is duration. As performance memories travel upward 
away from the realm of the actual or real, they create another sphere, top right. This 
sphere is moved by memory, and its surface is documents. These documents either 
tend back toward the real performance as records in the direction of the virtual or push 
away as scores toward the possible. If enough force is exerted in the score/possible 
direction the cone is reproduced as another different but connected performance. The 
tendencies of generative constraints that act on the middle of the cone reconfigure the 
relationship between the two spheres. They might be aesthetic, environmental, 
political and ethical forces. This accounts for the variable mixtures of virtualities and 
actualities operating through performance. 
Names, authenticity and attention; performance appears  
Another repetition in 9 Beginnings brought up a crucial aspect of how 
authenticity functions as a formula of fidelity and originality within performance and 
documentation. This work, previously by Lone Twin, consisted of the performers 
intimately addressing the audience and at one point using their own names. After 
much deliberation and attempts in several ways, Every House Has a Door decided 
that the most faithful way to restage the earlier performance would be to use the 
names of the performers in 9 Beginnings instead of the names in the previous work. 
By doing so, Every House Has a Door attempted to create the effect of the 
performance, and in doing so had to change the original score.  
This caused there to be fidelity in the present becoming to the past becoming, 
precisely through injecting differential originality. It may be that to repeat a past 
performance, whether that is through a new performance or through documentation, 
the present iteration is improved by taking the current material conditions into account. 
It will not do to merely recreate the recorded form the past work took, as might be the 
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case in repetitions aiming at an authentic reenactment. Such repetitions deny the 
importance of the situation for performance, and also misguidedly attach a singularity 
to the form of the past work when it was merely one of many manifestations. 
Singularity is contextual, it relates to the conditions of the performance event. 
When the performers of 9 Beginnings used their own names, it became a case 
of creating a sense of the ‘unauthentic’, to use Michael Pearson and Michael Shanks’ 
term from their 2001 book Theatre/Archaeology (pg. 119). The intentionally 
unauthentic repeats the past through showing that for the present, it must become in 
a new way. The transparency of composition found in the unauthentic places import 
on the totality of performance experience, rather than on the spoken text or 
movements of performance. Singular authenticity is not achievable because of the 
multiplicitous nature of repetition in the time-specificity of performance. That kind of 
authenticity assumes that the presence of the previous work consists of a trustworthy 
original. The unauthentic denies the notion of presence as an immutable quality of 
performance. It may be that presence and authenticity become strategies to attach 
possession and ownership to works of art by containing and limiting their forms. 
Attention to the time-specificity of performance shows that the connection between 
performers and material is an enduring and transforming relation. 
In time-specificity documents act as memories, and these memories make up 
one form of material available to performance. Other materials are the movements, 
words, atmosphere, audience configuration, and any other number of aesthetic 
decisions that may go into the formation of a work. When considered this way, the 
performers’ presence is yet another material, no more mysterious than the entrance 
to the space. So when the performers in 9 Beginnings said Selma and Sebastian 
instead of Gregg and Gary, they privileged the situation of the performance as material 
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instead of the Lone Twin text. Time-specificity uses the word attendants to describe 
both the artists and the audience, because all share in attending to the materials of 
performance. 
When attention as opposed to presence becomes the mode through which 
performance is made and considered, it no longer becomes viable to contain the 
relation between attendants and materials in fixed ontologies. Thus, the debates within 
performance studies around ontology, for example between Peggy Phelan and 
Rebecca Schneider become cast in a new light. Time-specificity of performance, both 
present and past, show that performance can not only disappear or remain. 
Performance appears. It may later disappear or remain, but for either to be possible it 
must first appear. This appearance is not necessarily primarily visual but instead made 
up of a multiplicity of sense perception and affect merged with concept. The 
appearance is a becoming of form, an eruption from virtuality to actuality. 
Composition as subtraction and freedom 
As a performance is being composed, whether it is from nine video documents 
or a new play written by someone sitting at a typewriter, each becoming of form is an 
act of attending to certain elements, which requires leaving many other elements out 
of the composition. In this way the creation of performance is an act of subtraction 
rather than addition. Time-specificity indicates that composition consists of choosing 
to attend to a very small number of elements and removing the many other possibilities 
that are at hand. In the beginning there are an infinite number of possibilities. The 
decision to choose nine beginnings instead of more, for example, immediately 
removed the majority of the video documents available from the work. As the 
composition process develops these possibilities are narrowed further and further 
down until attention is given to specific elements. It might seem that a transition is 
 16 
added, but in fact what is taken away is the appearance of disorder when attention is 
transferred from one material to another.  
 The act of composing performance requires time-specificity to consider the 
future as the temporality of the unknown. How much of a performance can be 
planned? This immediately brings up the issue of freedom and its opposite, which for 
time-specificity is control. Freedom is creativity with constraint, control is constraint 
itself. The time-specificity of performance future is a question of freedom. It is a 
negotiation with limits through creativity. To create something new within established 
limits is one possibility, but to reorganize limits is the absolute creative act. In this way 
time-specificity of performance future is also a question of ethics and politics. If the 
continuous nature of experience through time is taken seriously, then aesthetics, 
politics and ethics need to be considered as facets of experience with differences of 
degree.  
Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša 
 The time-specificity of performance future is illuminated by the work of Janez 
Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. In 2007 three Slovenian artists legally changed 
their names to the same name as the then right wing dictator of Slovenia. Each work 
in different disciplines but all were publicly known before the name change. However 
the artists gave personal reasons for assuming the same name as the politician, and 
for the most part continued doing what they had been doing before. While some would 
debate whether such an action could be called a performance, within the frame of 
time-specificity the Janez Janša project has a practical score and even generates 
legally authorized records in the form of identification cards, in addition to creating 
conditions for aesthetic experience of conceptual content. It is a performance that has 
an uncontrollable response in the public sphere. Journalists who up until that point had 
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been unable to criticize the politician Janez Janša for fear of lawsuits were now able 
to write whatever they wanted about the artist, knowing that the headlines would bear 
the name even when the name designated the artists. One journalist assumed the 
name of the then leader of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, and wrote an article titled ‘Is Janez 
Janša an Idiot?’ (Janša, Janša and Janša, ed. 2008 pg. 172).  
 The time-specificity of this artwork hinges on the fact that it has no ending 
through an aesthetic strategy that puts limits on the control of authorship. It is a 
performance that spreads between people, opening up possibilities of critique and 
response. Its future is uncertain. The artists gave up the control of their names, 
enabling new possibilities of creative critique. Although a name is attached to a self, 
the other is the one who most often utters the name. It is the people around Janez 
Janša who continue the piece. This is another example of the way both performers 
and audiences alike attend to materials of performance. It is also a useful model for a 
politics of performance, where the audience does the work of making meaning in the 
piece along with the artist.  
Such a situation is possible in any spatial or temporal configuration of 
performance. This kind of engagement can happen in the proscenium. Openness 
depends on the conceptual structure. For a performance to be open in this way 
requires a relinquishing of control, which is to say a transparency regarding how the 
performance is reorganizing the limits of freedom. Meaning must be unbound and 
experience must be carefully composed. This creates the conditions under which the 
performance becomes able to multiply by appearing and reappearing in unknown 
ways in the future.  
Immanent Encounter 
 18 
 When performance is composed in such a way as to allow all attendants a level 
playing field of access to material, an immanent encounter emerges. This is when a 
set of bodies collect a series of materials and attends to them, each in different ways, 
but without hierarchy. The immanent encounter assumes that the audience might 
know more about the art than the performers. This kind of relation operates through 
the inherent theoretical nomadism of performance, centered on movement and 
change, not fixities. The three Janez Janšas allow the name to be a material for 
political action, but do not program its results or lock down its interpretation. By stating 
that they have changed their names for personal reasons, they refuse to assume the 
role of artist as teacher, communicating a specific message toward its audience. The 
immanent encounter requires the choreographic practices to be centered, as they are 
in the work of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša, on a multiple mode of 
authorship. This is a pluralization of the artwork, a knock against any sovereignty of 
authorial control, formed through precise compositional strategies.  
The politics of performance are not restricted to either the social contracts set 
by spatial and temporal configurations or by the formal models the performance 
operates within. Politics arise through these channels and through the agency of all 
involved to engage in whatever mode they find most suitable. Time-specificity as the 
acknowledgment of the futurity and creativity of choreographic practices enables the 
immanent encounter, which asks nothing by allowing meaning and value to be 
negotiated between forces. These negotiations are sites of ethical relations, where 
experiences are conceived of as multiplicities, where union is the fallacy of normativity, 
in which difference is positive.  
 In immanent encounters conflict and desire become positive forces useful for 
the manifestation of affirmative gestures by all attendants of the performance. 
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Affirmative gestures are what sustain the immanent encounter. Desire for the 
performance to go on, conflict in a discussion afterward, even leaving or intervening 
on a performance can make up affirmative gestures that sustain the immanent 
encounter. Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša allows the rest of us to find 
out what the artwork will be, through our energy to create new conditions of empathy 
and intimacy in social life. Immanent encounters are actualizations of the affirmative 
gestures that are virtuals of the artwork. In the best of immanent encounters, the 
composition allows all attendants the freedom to do more with the work than the work 
does itself. Attendants might think nothing of Janez Janša, or they might come to focus 
on their experience through time, aware of history, acting of the present, and interested 
in creating a future that will be better than what is now. Through creating conditions 
for action and thought, performance makes new futures possible. Thinking temporally 
opens up these options because the future is unknowable. The ability to act of the 
present and the use of the past as memory creates the necessary conditions for the 
modification of experience through performance. 
Ending  
What will happen when Janez Janša dies? In court the politician has used 
another first name, the one he was born with. Will his gravestone read that name or 
the one with which he performed politically and thus will connect him to history? Will 
the artists’ children have a say over the name on the artists’ gravestone? Their creative 
act proposes such questions, which interrogate the temporal continuity between art 
and life. Janez Janša reveals that performance is an act of life, and thus is an element 
of the slow development of evolution. That is the constraint within which freedom 
through creativity is possible, the durations that become as mixtures of the actual and 
the virtual, and wait to become again. Time-specificity of performance reveals these 
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processes through temporal thinking about lived experience. The present experience 
of performance operates through a heterogeneity of forces and tendencies. The past 
continues and the future is left open. It becomes more and more difficult to tell when 
one process begins and another ends. 
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